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THE RECIPROCITY OF LEGAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES: REFOCUSING THE CRAIG
TEST IN EVALUATING GENDER-BASED
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
It may be impossible to ever know how the Equal Rights
Amendment' would have or could have changed the American
legal landscape. Currently, the landscape is littered with in-
consistent bodies of statutory and case law governing legal
treatment based on gender. Some ERA opponents have ar-
gued that additional language in the Constitution is unneces-
sary to secure equal rights between women and men.2 The
Constitution, it is argued, currently has sufficient language to
achieve the goals that the ERA was to have attained. Ac-
knowledging that the job of revising outmoded sex-biased
laws can be done without an ERA, one leading commentator
nevertheless observes that there is a pressing need for an "au-
thoritative formulation of the basic norm" of equality between
the sexes in order for the courts to clean up the landscape.'
The alternative to curing gender discrimination with an
ERA is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
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1. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution
read:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
S. J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 271 (1971); S. J. Res. 9, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 272 (1971); H.R.J. Res. 207, 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117
CONG. REC. 526 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ERA].
2. Corker, Bradwell v. State: Some Reflections Prompted by Myra Bradwell's
Hard Case that Made "Bad Law," 53 WASH. L. REV. 215, 247 (1978). Professor
Corker claims that the ERA's chief value was symbolic and would have set a danger-
ous precedent in constitutional law.
3. Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amend-
ments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 174 (1979). Professor Ginsburg has argued many of
the leading equal protection cases before the United States Supreme Court.
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ment.' The fifth amendment due process clause has also been
interpreted to contain an equal protection guarantee which is
binding on the federal government.' During the 1970's, the
United States Supreme Court handed down a number of cases
interpreting the equal protection clause with respect to gender
discrimination. e What emerged from this line of cases is the
development of a new legal standard of judicial review, the
"middle tier" or substantial relationship test,7 as enunciated
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment reads in pertinent part: "No
state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
5. Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court in Bolling held that the
fifth amendment's due process clause is applicable against the federal government as
an equivalent guarantee of equality with the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause. Of course, neither the ERA nor the equal protection clause could have reme-
died private action unaccompanied by official participation.
6. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1974), reh'g denied, 420 U.S.
966 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
7. For an insightful analysis of the middle tier model, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886-1105 (1978). See also Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Lau-
rence Tribe, the Middle Tier and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. Rv. 525 (1980).
The "traditional" doctrine of equal protection analysis developed throughout the
1960's. The two-tiered model applied a relatively weak standard of review to most
legislative classifications; the classification would survive if it was rationally related
to a legitimate governmental objective. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 417 (1970); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). One commentator assesses
the rule of rationality as a shorthand articulation of the rule of clear mistake, and
that because of the great amount of deference given to the legislature, the rule actu-
ally becomes one of no mistake. Fox, Equal Protection Analysis, 14 U.S.F.L. Rav. at
526 n.3.
When the classification or legislation involves a "suspect" class (e.g., race) or a
"fundamental" right (voting, for example) then the statute is presumed invalid unless
the state can prove that the legislative objective was based on a compelling state
interest and that the classification was necessary to achieve it. This strict scrutiny
standard is nearly impossible for lawmaking bodies to meet. Id. at n.4. See, e.g., Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
See generally Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALw. L.
REv. 339 (1949), which heralded the great developing period of the equal protection
doctrine.
Middle tier equal protection analysis rests on the same premise as the rational
relationship and strict scrutiny tests: that similarly situated persons should be
treated equally unless the state can justify its unequal treatment by demonstrating
an overriding state interest. The middle tier presumably applies a standard of scru-
tiny which falls somewhere between rational and compelling. According to Craig v.
Boren the state must demonstrate an important governmental objective which is sub-
stantially related to the achievement of.such objectives in order to justify a gender-
based classification. 429 U.S. 190, 197.
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in Craig v. Boren and propounded in several commentaries. 8
The thesis of this comment is that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Craig test is inadequate for the purpose
of evaluating gender-based classifications under the equal pro-
tection clause, because it yields inconsistent results. The test
should further the general rationale of the equal protection
clause: the right of each individual to equal concern and re-
spect as a person under the law.'
The Court's application in gender discrimination cases of
the underlying premise of traditional equal protection analy-
sis, that similarly situated persons ought to be treated equally,
seems to have caused a fundamental problem with the post-
Craig case law. Theoretically, if the Court were to determine
that the challenged classes are not similarly situated, the state
will not have to justify its classification. Moreover, classifica-
tions based on factors other than gender will be evaluated ac-
cording to a lenient rational relationship standard.
It appears, however, that the Court has difficulty deciding
when women and men are to be considered similarly situated.
It has sometimes held that physiological differences between
the genders meant that they were not similarly situated, par-
ticularly where sexual or military matters were at issue.1" At
other times, the Court has determined that classifications are
not explicitly predicated on gender but on some other factor,
such as finding that the statute discriminates between preg-
nant women and non-pregnant persons rather than between
women and men.11 Because of this unfocused approach, the
character of the Court's treatment of gender-based classifica-
tions has ranged from pure legal egalitarianism 2 to old-fash-
ioned prejudice. 8 This comment will suggest that there exists
8. See, e.g., Cassen, Equal Protection-Equal Status: A Summary of Sex Dis-
crimination Cases Since Frontiero, 11 LINCOLN L. REV. 167 (1980); Roberts, Gender-
Based Draft Registration, Congressional Policy and Equal Protection: A Proposal
for Deferential Middle-Tier Review, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 35-93 (1980); Note, However
the Discrimination is Described, if Gender-Based, the Substantial Relation Test Ap-
plies, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 431-45.
9. Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights - the Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 J. L. & EDuc. 3, 10 (1977).
10. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
12. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
13. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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a standard of judicial review which flows from the existing
body of case law, particularly the cases handling the distribu-
tion of social responsibility, that would produce more consis-
tent results than the standard which the Court has been using
in its application of the Craig test. By adopting it, the courts
will come closer to completing the work that the ERA was to
have accomplished.
Justice Stevens, concurring in Craig, recognized the possi-
bility that something less than justice could result from overly
particularized standards of review:
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as
the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does
not describe a completely logical method of deciding
cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in
a reasonably consistent fashion. I also suspect that a care-
ful explanation of the reasons motivating particular deci-
sions may contribute more to an identification of that
standard than an attempt to articulate it in all-encom-
passing terms."'
A more effective way to evaluate gender-based discrimi-
nation is to extend the single standard to which Justice Ste-
vens refers toward a standard which evenhandedly allocates
rights and responsibilities among individuals of both sexes. If
the equal protection clause, as Craig and its progeny have in-
terpreted it, is to embody the norm of equality between
women and men, the single standard suggested by Justice Ste-
vens should be applied.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE Craig TEST
The Reconstruction Amendments' 5 were enacted soon af-
ter the Civil War as expressions of legislative hostility to slav-
ery and as a proclamation of the supremacy of the federal
14. 429 U.S. 190 at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
15. The Reconstruction Amendments were the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. The thirteenth amendment reads in perti-
nent part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. See
pertinent part of fourteenth amendment, supra note 4. The fifteenth amendment,
reads in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
[Vol. 23240
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government over the states."' Out of these three amendments
grew the "antidiscrimination principle" which disfavors legis-
lative classifications that depend on race or ethnic origin. 17
The most significant application of the antidiscrimination
principle was made during the 1950's and 1960's by the War-
ren Court through its decisions invalidating racially discrimi-
natory governmental decisions and conduct.1 The principle
was later expanded to encompass classifications based on
alienage, 19 legitimacy,20 and sex.2
Doctrines dealing with gender discrimination were devel-
oped by the Burger Court during the 1970's, but the Court
had actually dealt with the gender issue earlier. All gender-
based classifications reviewed by the Court under the four-
teenth amendment before 1971 were upheld.2 The following
discussion illustrates how the Court extracted the current test
from traditional equal protection doctrine.
In Reed v. Reed,2 3 when confronted with a state statute
which expressed a preference for men over women to be ap-
16. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 416.
17. Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the An-
tidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976). See, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145 (1965); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Tussman
and TenBroek, supra note 7, for a discussion of the history of equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment prior to the 1954 Brown decision.
19. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
20. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); Glona v. American Guar. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 73 (1968).
21. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
22. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding state law excluding
women from service on grand or petit juries unless they volunteer); Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute forbidding women to tend bar unless
the wife or daughter of the male owner); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law for women); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (due process permits state imposed limits on working hours of women);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (state not compelled to admit an otherwise
qualified woman to the bar).
It is beyond the scope of this comment to consider doctrines concerning classifi-
cations based on legitimacy other than to say that the level of scrutiny used to evalu-
ate such classifications approximates the one employed to evaluate gender discrimi-
nation. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976).
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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pointed administrator of decedent's estate, the Court broke
new ground by invalidating the classification."4 Relying on a
1920 tax discrimination case, Royster Guano v. Virginia,6 the
Court held that legislative classifications must be "reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the leg-
islation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."'
The Court in Reed had moved into an unexplored area of
judicial scrutiny. At the time, only race and alienage were con-
sidered suspect classifications, triggering strict scrutiny. Yet
the standard borrowed from Royster seemed to be stronger
than the alternative rational relationship test. If the Court
had used a rationality test, the state justification of adminis-
trative convenience would most likely have been accepted.'
The Court divided sharply two years later in Frontiero v.
Richardson 28 over the question of whether sex-based classifi-
cations were inherently suspect. A federal statute provided
that housing and medical benefits were available to wives of
military officers without question, but husbands of military
officers were required to prove actual dependency. Invalidat-
ing the statute, the plurality observed that the discrimination
contained both a procedural and a substantive dimension.
Only female officers bore the procedural burden of proving
their spouses' dependency. Female officers who provided less
than half their spouses' support were denied the substantive
benefits available to similarly situated male officers.
The legislative scheme in Frontiero was invalidated be-
cause it was based on outdated sexual stereotypes about
"breadwinners" and "dependents." The plurality opinion
compared the classification in Frontiero with those based on
race and alienage, calling them "inherently suspect" and sug-
24. Id. at 76-77.
25. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
26. 404 U.S. at 76. For a similar treatment involving a state child support stat-
ute granting mandatory support to males until the age of twenty-one and to females
until the age of eighteen see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
27. See supra note 7.
28. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Five Justices disagreed with the plurality's holding that
sex-based classifications were inherently suspect. Of those five, Justices Stewart and
Powell concurred in the judgment in separate opinions with Justices Burger and
Blackmun joining Justice Powell's opinion. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
242 [Vol. 23
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gesting that all three kinds be subject to strict scrutiny 2 9 Al-
though the Frontiero decision was based on Reed, the plural-
ity recognized that by departing from "traditional rational
basis analysis" it was using a stronger version of scrutiny than
the Court actually employed in Reed.30
The plurality of four Justices argued that gender was an
immutable characteristic which made it a suspect classifica-
tion. Noting that subtle gender discrimination pervades our
educational institutions, job market, and political arenas, the
plurality opinion also mentioned the passage of the ERA by
Congress, concluding that classifications based on sex are "in-
herently invidious." 1
Following Frontiero, the Court struggled with developing
an appropriate standard of review for gender-based discrimi-
nation. It upheld as many classifications as it invalidated. For
example, in Kahn v. Shevin-2 the Court upheld a property tax
exemption available to widows but not to widowers because
the state's purpose was to reduce economic disparities be-
tween men and women. The Court reasoned that such com-
pensatory discrimination, analogous to affirmative action em-
ployment practices, outweighed the seriousness of a
classification based on sex.
Another gender-based classification was upheld in
Geduldig v. Aiello,"4 which involved a state disability insur-
ance plan that excluded disabilities attributable to pregnancy.
By recharacterizing the nature of the discrimination, the
Court accepted the state's argument that the scheme merely
discriminated between non-pregnant persons and pregnant
29. Id. at 688.
30. Id. at 684. The Court cited eighteenth century historical analyst Alexis de
Tocqueville, who observed that the history of sex discrimination is as old as the na-
tion. The French commentator once wrote: "The Americans have applied to the sexes
the great principle of political economy which governs the manufacturers of our age,
by carefully dividing the duties of man from those of woman in order that the great
work of society may be the better carried on." 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 222-23 (1954).
31. 411 U.S. at 687-88.
32. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 689 n.22 for
language containing the seeds of the benevolent discrimination doctrine.
33. 416 U.S. at 353, 355 ("We deal here with. a state tax law reasonably designed
to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the
sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.").
34. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
19831
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women." A major factor influencing the Court was the
financial viability of public welfare programs: "Particularly
with respect to social welfare programs, so long as the line
drawn by the state is rationally supportable, the courts will
not impose their judgment as to the appropriate stopping
point." 6 This was a major deviation from the direction set in
Frontiero because the Court retreated to the weak, rational
relationship test without even finding a compensatory basis
for the classification.
In Schlesinger v. Ballard37 the Court upheld a statute
prescribing a longer period of time for female officers to qual-
ify for promotion than for male officers."8 The Court did not
even question the government's justification that the program
served to compensate female officers for prior discriminatory
military employment practices. The Court was reluctant to in-
trude upon the business of the military. "[I]t is for Congress
and not the courts to decide when the policy goals sought to
be served by the [promotion scheme] are no longer
necessary .. "89
Without having committed itself to a well-defined stan-
dard of review, the Court in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 0 in-
validated a denial of "[m]other's insurance benefits" under
the Social Security Act to a widower father, even though the
distinction was similar to the tax exemption in Kahn. The
Court reasoned that the statute was based on "archaic and
overbroad generalizations" about the role of male and female
parents.'1 It further remarked that "[t]he mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects any inquiry into the actual purposes underly-
ing a statutory scheme." 42 In addition to looking beyond the
asserted purposes of any scheme it reviewed under the equal
35. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
36. Id. at 496.
37. 419 U.S. 498 (1975), reh'g denied, 420 U.S. 966 (1975).
38. The scheme essentially provided that if a naval officer did not qualify for
promotion within a certain period of time, he would be discharged. Female officers,
however, were granted a longer period of time within which to qualify. See 10 U.S.C.
§§ 6382, 6401 (1976).
39. Id. at 510 n.13.
40. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
41. Id. at 643.
42. Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
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protection clause, the Court indicated that it was looking for
a very close fit between the purposes of the scheme and a gen-
der-based distinction."
Finally, in Craig v. Boren" the Court clarified its stan-
dard of review when it invalidated an Oklahoma prohibition
on the sale of liquor to males eighteen to twenty-one years
old. Citing the Reed decision, the Court stated: "To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifi-
cations by gender must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives."' "4 Pointing out the illogic of upholding the
statute on the basis of any sort of compensatory motive, the
Court accepted the state's goal of enhanced traffic safety as its
motive,'7 but it rejected the statistical argument that young
men are more prone to auto accidents than women as too
weak a relationship to justify the state's goal.
With Craig, the Supreme Court had made it plain that
once a classification was found to discriminate on the basis of
gender, it would be upheld only upon the showing of an im-
portant state interest. Administrative convenience, ' outdated
stereotypes regarding sex roles," and traditional assumptions
about dependency 0 would not be enough to sustain a sex-
based classification. But the pre-Craig cases revealed that the
Court would uphold statutes where the state could show a
genuine compensatory motive,51 or where the issue was related
to the Court's perception of a female physical role.2
III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE Craig v. Boren
Armed with a new articulable test to be applied to claims
of gender discrimination under the equal protection clause,
the Court decided a variety of issues which fell into three gen-
eral categories: (1) Social responsibility," (2) economic access
43. Id. at 648 n.16.
44. Id. at 653.
45. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
46. Id. at 197.
47. Id. at 199.
48. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
49. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
50. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
51. E.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
52. E.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
53. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
1983]
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and equality,54 and (3) physiological differences. 8 The hold-
ings within each category were consistent with one another,
but the law among them was not. It is this lack of consistency
among the three types of cases which underscores the weak-
ness of the Court's application of the Craig test.
It is clear from an examination of the later gender dis-
crimination cases that the Court has not developed a third
discrete test forming the middle tier of equal protection anal-
ysis. Instead, it has created a sliding scale upon which the un-
derlying policies range. Classifications involving social respon-
sibilities (such as estate administration or alimony) were
invariably invalidated. When the classification turned on the
physiological differences between the genders, the Court up-
held the scheme. The Court decided least consistently in the
area of access to economic equality, although it has set reason-
ably firm groundwork toward invalidating most discriminatory
classifications.
A. Social Responsibilities
Reed,6 Stanton,e  and Craig" are archetypical examples
of the social responsibility value; each dealt with the unfavor-
ably impacted class' right -to be treated as equals. The dis-
crimination invalidated in those cases was arbitrary, irra-
tional, and unjust. The distinction, solely based on gender,
would have operated to deprive the affected individual of a
right generally thought to be available to each person: to be
an estate administrator, to receive child support, to enjoy the
privilege of buying liquor.
After Craig, several cases were decided on social responsi-
bility grounds. In Orr v. Orr,59 an Alabama statute which pro-
vided that males but not females could be required to pay ali-
mony to the divorced spouse was invalidated. Similar to
442 U.S. 256 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979).
54. See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199.(1977).
55. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464 (1981); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
56. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
57. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
58. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
59. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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Craig, the alimony statute was held underinclusive because it
deprived (needy) males of an opportunity that the state was
willing to extend to (needy) females. Consistent with the line
of social responsibility cases, Orr stands for the proposition
that there can be no justification for less than even-handed
allocation of responsibility, particularly if the allocation is
based upon outmoded stereotypes.60
In Caban v. Mohammed,61 the Court invalidated another
traditional notion that "a natural mother . . . bears a closer
relationship with her child. . . than a father does."' 62 This no-
tion was the basis for the state adoption statute. The Court
believed that the statute, which granted only an unwed
mother the authority to consent to her child's adoption, re-
sulted in an arbitrary denial of the father's right to share re-
sponsibility for the illegitimate child."
Like Reed and Orr, the unanimous decision of the Court
in Kirchberg v. Feenstra," invalidating a Louisiana "head and
master" statute, indicated that it is unlikely that any justifica-
tion could uphold an arbitrary denial of equal responsibility
for the normal affairs of life. This feature is what makes the
social responsibility cases paradigm examples of the Court's
proper application of the Craig standard.
The only inconsistency in this area arises when the mili-
tary is involved. For example, in Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney," the Court upheld a state absolute lifetime hiring
preference for veterans in public positions even though the
policy overwhelmingly favored males. The Court excused this
inequity by recharacterizing the distinction as one between
veterans and non-veterans. It noted that the low number of
female veterans was "attributable . . . to the variety of fed-
eral statutes, regulations, and policies that have restricted the
number of women who could enlist in the United States
Armed Forces, and largely to the simple fact that women have
never been subject to a military draft."66
60. 440 U.S. 268, 288 (1979).
61. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
62. Id. at 388.
63. Id. at 394.
64. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
65. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
66. Id. at 269-70.
1983]
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The majority added a novel element17 to the Craig analy-
sis by relying on a race discrimination case which held that a
neutral statute is not violative of the equal protection clause
solely because it results in a disproportionate impact. 8 In-
stead, the equal protection clause is violated only when the
disproportionate impact can be traced to a purpose to dis-
criminate on the basis of race. 9 The Court stated that: "Dis-
criminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It
either is a factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it
is not. '70 Hedging, the Court went on to recognize that the
enlistment policies of the armed services might be discrimina-
tory, "but the history of discrimination against women in the
military is not on trial in this case."'7'
B. Economic Access and Equality
A second major category of policies turns on access to full
economic participation in society, particularly through the
public sector. The original access cases, Frontiero v. Richard-
son" and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,7 involved proof of de-
pendency provisions which operated to prevent spouses from
enjoying equal access to public economic benefits. Presump-
tions based on archaic and overbroad generalizations about
women's role as dependents and men's role as breadwinners
were rejected. The Supreme Court repeatedly commented on
the increased need and opportunity for women to enter the
workplace.
After Craig, the Court invalidated similar provisions
which deprived widowers and children of needed public eco-
nomic assistance. In these cases,7 the Court found that the
67. Id. at 273.
68. Id. at 273-74.
69. The Court relied on Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), for authority
that the equal protection clause requires a showing of a discriminatory intent. Id. at
238-44.
70. 442 U.S. at 277.
71. Id. at 278. When one considers that the Massachusetts veterans hiring pref-
erences was predicated of the federal congressional power to recruit and draft pre-
dominately male military, then the decision in Feeney becomes clearer. See infra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rostker v. Goldberg.
72. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
73. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
74. Wengler v. Druggist's Mutual, 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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classifications violated both the substantive and procedural
aspects of equal protection. Substantively, one class would
have received greater benefits than the other. Procedurally,
the disfavored class bore burdens of proof from which the fa-
vored class was exempt.
The Court has remarked that it will grant wide latitude
to classifications made under social welfare legislation, but it
will not grant immunity from constitutional scrutiny.75 The
state interest in saving costs is frequently an overriding factor
in the defense of legislative classifications. The Court, how-
ever, has frequently focused on the goal of reducing the his-
toric disparity in economic conditions between men and
women caused by discrimination against women.7 6 This policy
arises whenever the Court upholds a classification as compen-
satory. Significantly, though, both in Kahn and Webster the
respective governments would have incurred additional ex-
penses if similarly situated males had been afforded the same
benefits that the statutes granted women.
C. Physiological Differences
The third major category of cases turns on the physiologi-
cal differences between men and women. These classifications
have been uniformly upheld, although the split among the
Justices in the decisions reveals that this area is far from set-
tled. In the pre-Craig case of Geduldig v. Aiello,7 the Court
characterized a pregnancy exclusion from state disability plan
as a distinction between pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons. The Court apparently found it incidental that only
one sex was ever incapacitated by pregnancy."8 The only way
to explain this unusual reasoning is that the Court must have
been reacting to the spectre of increasing compensation costs
for subsidizing reproduction.
75. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 210.
76. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); see also Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974).
77. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
78. See General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), for the proposition that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex-based discrimination. Congress
rejected the Court's archaic view by overturning the Title VII determination of Gen-
eral Electric in Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
2000e to proscribe discrimination on the basis of pregnancy). See also Ginsberg,
supra note 3, at 171, n.68.
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More recently, in Parham v. Hughes79 the Court upheld a
statute which placed different burdens on males and females
by recharacterizing the classification. In Parham, a statute
which prevented unwed fathers but not unwed mothers of ille-
gitimates from filing a wrongful death action for the death of
the child was determined to be a distinction between fathers
who legitimate their children and fathers who do not.80 The
Court in Parham was influenced by the traditional image of a
casual, wandering, possibly unknown male making spurious
claims on the death of an illegitimate child.
The traditional stereotype of the male who is less deserv-
ing of full legislative respect also figured into the Court's deci-
sion in Michael M. v. Superior Courts1 which upheld a statu-
tory rape law that prosecutes males only. The plurality in this
case found that males and females affected by the statute
were not similarly situated. The plurality found that the law
was central to the state's objective of preventing teenage preg-
nancy.2 To decide thus, the Court must have found, unlike in
Geduldig,s8 that the fact that only females could become preg-
nant was not incidental to the classification. Even if preg-
nancy prevention was the state's true goal, it does not follow
that because only teenage females become pregnant, only
males are responsible for the pregnancy. This legal distinction
based upon a physical characteristic is patently unfair, espe-
cially when liability is imposed in such a heavy-handed man-
ner. If pregnancy is truly the problem, perhaps in at least the
statutory sense, a more logical choice would be to impose lia-
bility on both partners. The "natural deterrence" of preg-
79. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
S0. Id. at 355. There existed a statutory procedure whereby an unwed father
could legitimate his child. Mothers were not included in this statute. The wrongful
death remedy was available to unwed fathers who performed the additional step of
legitimating their offspring, even though mothers could sue without legitimating their
offspring. 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979).
81. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
82. 450 U.S. at 468-69. Justice Rehnquist analyzed the Craig test as if it were a
slightly more stringent version of the traditional rational relationship test. He ob-
served that pregnancy would be a natural deterrent to teenage females which would
equalize the sanctions befalling the two sexes. He relied on language in Parham
which reflected that "underlying [the Court's previous] decisions is the principle that
a legislature may not make overbroad generalizations based on sex which are entirely
unrelated to any differences between men and women or which demean the ability or
social status of the affected class." Id. (citing Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354
(1979)) (emphasis added).
83. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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nancy for a teenage female, as suggested by Justice Rehn-
quist," does not seem related in any way to the criminal
penalty imposed solely on the male.
The Court again found that men and women are not simi-
larly situated in Rostker v. Goldberg.85 Rostker involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of the male only Military
Selective Service registration system. The Court upheld the
classification on the basis of another statute which forbade
women to participate in combat or to be drafted, concluding
that for the purposes of the registration system, women and
men are not similarly situated. As it did in Personnel Admin-
istrator v. Feeney, the Court avoided confronting a clear case
of gender discrimination by resting its holding of validity on a
second underlying statute which is also discriminatory."" Fur-
thermore, as in Schlesinger v. Ballards8 the Court showed ex-
treme deference to Congress' authority to regulate military
affairs.
The rationale underlying all of the physiological differ-
ence decisions, however, is the perception that the physical
differences between men and women somehow create a legal
distinction between otherwise similarly situated individuals.
In all of these cases, women and men have been categorically
excluded from performing fundamental social obligations.
Contrary to the decision in Craig, in which the Court held the
test to be whether the classification itself was substantially re-
lated to the achievement of important government objectives,
the Court simply abdicated its responsibility by diverting its
focus to non-issues such as whether men and women are simi-
larly situated to serve in combat.
Recharacterization of gender discrimination begs the
question. It masks prejudicial preferences in a particularly
cavalier way. The dissent in Geduldig, for example, noted that
the effects of pregnancy excluded from a disability plan were
"functionally indistinguishable" from the effects caused by
84. 450 U.S. at 473.
85. 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 495, 506-07
(1975)). See also 453 U.S. at 79 where the majority relies on Michael M. v. Superior
Court for the proposition that the sexes are not similarly situated in this case.
86. See supra note 65-71 and accompanying notes.
87. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. Even assuming the legiti-
macy of a policy excluding women from combat, a statute substantially related to
such an interest would not have to also exclude women from selective service registra-
tion because women could be drafted into non-combat positions.
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another disability."s
This conflict highlights the anomalous nature of the
Court's treatment of physiological differences. The difference
between female and male has been incorporated into the
Court's rationale behind essentially economic or political dis-
tinctions. Yet, the earlier Craig analysis had always asked
whether the unfavorable effects of a gender-neutral statute
would be outweighed by the effects of a discriminatory
scheme. In Parham, the unwed mother was not permitted to
legitimate her illegitimate child. If she and the father had had
the same option at law, the wrongful death action provision
would have had a more logical, even-handed basis. Alterna-
tively, if all unwed parents had been required to show proof of
parentage in a wrongful death action, there would have been
no violation of the equal protection clause. Instead, the Court
tortured the classic equal protection analysis to avoid apply-
ing the true Craig test by perceiving a non-gender
discrimination.
To summarize, the current doctrine that the Court ap-
plies when faced with a challenged statute under the equal
protection clause is to initiate the following inquiry. First, it
must find that there is an actual discrimination between
women and men. The Court is more likely to find such dis-
crimination when the underlying issue involves social respon-
sibilities. If the issue can be recharacterized as between clas-
ses not based on gender, the Craig test will be inapplicable,
although a weaker form of scrutiny may still apply. If the is-
sue involves reproduction or the capacity to procreate, the
Court will probably find that women and men are not simi-
larly situated.
After finding a gender-based distinction, the Court will
examine the articulated governmental objectives for creating
the classification. The Court will not attempt to discover what
the objectives are. The party defending the classification bears
the entire burden of explaining the governmental purposes. If
they involve military recruitment or promotion policy, the in-
quiry will most likely end there. If the defending party ad-
vances a clearly compensatory objective, and not a mere reci-
88. 417 U.S. at 500-01. The dissent also noted that other sex-linked disabilities




tation of benign purpose, the Court will validate the
classification. The classification will be upheld, however, only
if it favors females by redressing the class for historic inequi-
ties. Simple administrative convenience, judicial economy, or
cost savings alone will never be accepted as legitimate ends.
Finally, the fit between the state's important objective
and the classification must be substantial. The gender-based-
scheme must be substantially necessary to carry out the state
policies behind the statute. If the Court reaches the issue, this
requirement of substantial relationship will ordinarily carry a
presumption of statutory invalidity.
The Craig analysis as it now stands produces inconsistent
results. There is no distinct line between those cases where
the gender-based classification was upheld and those where it
was not. Yet with some certainty, it can be said that chal-
lenges involving social responsibilities will stand the strongest
chance of success.
IV. JUSTICE STEVENS' APPROACH
The antidiscrimination principle has always stood for the
even-handed regard for each individual. Justice Stevens' no-
tion of a standard based on responsibility closely approxi-
mates this ideal. Although not as accurate as it should be,
Justice Stevens' standard provides valuable insights into the
process by which treating people as equals can be achieved: 89
[A] traditional classification is more likely to be used
without pausing to consider its justification than a newly
created classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes
it more acceptable and natural to distinguish between
male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegiti-
mate; for too much of our history there was some inertia
in distinguishing between black and white. But that sort
of stereotyped reaction may have no rational relationship-
other than pure prejudicial discrimination to the stated
purpose for which the classification is being made.' 0
Justice Stevens appears to be the only member of the
89. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 496 (1981) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 403 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1972) (Stevens, J., concurring).
90. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 213 n.5 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
520-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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Burger Court willing to find and condemn unjustified gender
discrimination against either sex without forcing the distinc-
tion to fit the pattern of invidious discrimination. It is enough
that similarly situated individuals have been treated dispa-
rately at the hands of the law without a countervailing state
goal. He has not found it necessary to find discrimination
which implied that one sex is inferior to another, or to dis-
cover a distinction which adds to the burdens of an already
disadvantaged class of people.
Justice Stevens' remarks in these cases suggest that he
bases all equal protection analysis on a general comparison of
the amount of harm done to the disadvantaged class with the
purposes that the classification is likely to achieve. 1 A dispro-
portionate level of harm is violative of the equal protection
clause. Justice Stevens' determination of a disproportionate
amount of harm is related to his notion of personal
responsibility.
The following discussion will illustrate Justice Stevens'
view of equality through responsibilities and will show how he
incorporates this principle into the physiological difference
cases. His conclusions about all three categories of cases are
logically consistent by reflecting his primary concern with gov-
ernmental even-handedness. 2
In Craig v. Boren, where young males were forbidden
from buying liquor because the Oklahoma legislature was con-
cerned about traffic safety, Justice Stevens found the classifi-
cation objectionable because it was based on gender.93 The
statute condemned the entire class of males between eighteen
91. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. at 495.
92. Compare Justice Stevens' views with Watson, Self-Consciousness and the
Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature, 1979 ENVTL. ETHICS 99. Professor Watson
presents a reciprocity framework as an analysis of morality and as an explanation and
justification of the attribution of moral rights and responsibilities. His view seems to
be a highly moralistic one, resting on the Golden Rule:
Consider the admonition to do unto others as you would have them
do unto you. Even if it is only a hope, this implies that if you assume a
right of behavior toward others, then they have the same right of behav-
ior toward you, and that they should accept as a duty to behave toward
you as you behave toward them. Similarly, the admonition to act only in
ways, the general description of which can be proposed as universal
moral principles, is to imply that, by assuming rights, you accede that
all others have the same rights and that it is the duty of all to abide by
the embodied universal principles.
Id. at 100.
93. 429 U.S. at 212.
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and twenty-one on the basis of an unrepresentative few. His
concept of individual responsibility requires that all individu-
als be held accountable for traffic safety. The imposition of
the state legislative classification, however, operated to deny
the affected class of males the opportunity to behave respon-
sibly. Denial of the opportunity to participate in social re-
sponsibilities on an equal basis with the opposite sex was a
harm disproportionately greater than the consequences of the
offsetting state policy of reducing accidents and therefore vio-
lated equal protection.
Justice Stevens' view of equality through responsibilities
can have harsh implications. In Caban v. Mohammed,9' the
majority, relying on the authority of Craig, invalidated a stat-
utory classification which would have resulted in an unwed
mother having the sole authority to consent to the illegitimate
child's adoption. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that
even though unwed parents shared the responsibility for con-
ception, only the mother had a constitutional right to deter-
mine independently whether or not to bear the child." By ac-
cepting the responsibility of bringing new life into the world,
the mother acquired superior rights to determine the child's
future with respect to adoption.
This view is partly based on pragmatic acknowledgement
of the fact that frequently the mother is the only one who
knows the identity of the child's father and that she could just
as well marry someone else. Although it could be argued that
this view is rooted in the theme of physiological differences, it
seems that Justice Stevens actually focused on the practical
alternatives available to the unwed mother. Since she bore the
largest portion of the responsibility for the child, she should
have the ultimate right to consent to its adoption.
Justice Stevens does not appear to subscribe to the view
that physiological differences per se create legal distinctions
between the sexes. Dissenting in Michael M.,96 he expressly
rejected the connection that the plurality drew between the
prosecution of males for statutory rape and the fact that only
females become pregnant. 7 In light of the state goal of reduc-
ing teenage pregnancy, he found the justification wholly inad-
94. 441 U.S. 380.
95. Id. at 403.
96. 450 U.S. at 496.
97. Id. at 497.
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equate because it took both partners to produce a pregnancy.
Since the natural differences between the sexes were irrele-
vant to him vis-A-vis the state purpose, only a statute which
subjected both males and females to criminal liability would
have satisfied the equal protection clause.
Although Justice Stevens' view of equality may be strin-
gent in demanding equal personal responsibility, it is tem-
pered with a deep sense of fairness. "[Elven if my logic is
faulty and there actually is some speculative basis for treating
equally guilty males and females differently, I still believe
that any such speculative justification would be outweighed
by the paramount interest in even-handed enforcement of
the law." 8
Justice Stevens' emphasis on fairness is also revealed in
the dependency cases. In Califano v. Goldfarb," he concurred
in the invalidation of a Social Security Act provision which
required widowers, but not widows, to prove actual depen-
dency on the deceased spouse in order to collect survivor's
benefits. Though the majority found that the classification im-
posed a procedural burden on males and a substantive burden
on female wage earners, the relevant issue in Justice Stevens'
view was the male plaintiffs claim for benefits. The key in-
quiry for him was whether similarly situated persons were
treated differently solely because they were not of the same
sex. His concurrence was based on the Court's holding in Wie-
senfeld,100 indicating that he thought the challenged classifica-
tion was directly linked to outmoded sexual stereotypes about
dependency. Justice Stevens reiterated his disagreement with
the majority of the Court in Wengler v. Druggists Mutua 0 1
stating that he did not share the view of simultaneous disfa-
vor of males and females.
V. A SOLUTION TO THE Craig TEST CONFUSION
The Supreme Court has demonstrated that the Craig test
is unwieldy and too difficult to use, particularly when the ba-
sis of a classification is rooted in military matters, child rear-
ing, or reproductive capacity. The Court has also demon-
98. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
99. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
100. Id. at 220.
101. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
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strated some confusion when considering whether a
compensatory motive will save a gender-based classification
from invalidation. The result has been an inconsistent body of
case law in which the challenged gender-based distinctions
have not been faced squarely.
The major cases, however, particularly those decided dur-
ing the interval from Reed to Craig, suggest that certain un-
derlying values have consistently played a part in the Court's
decision making. From these values flow a general principle to
which Justice Stevens has alluded. Justice Stevens' theme of
responsibility with fairness should be extended to form the
following standard: Does the challenged classification serve to
further the equal distribution of legal rights and responsibili-
ties between the affected individuals? If the classification does
nothing to further the equal distribution of legal rights and
responsibilities, then the Craig standard should be applied to
determine whether the state has an important interest which
would outweigh the detriment to the affected class.
The link between legal responsibilities and rights would
serve to further the antidiscrimination principle by clarifying
the notion of similarly situated. Classes would be similarly sit-
uated when they shared the same social responsibilities. To
the extent that different classes are charged with the same so-
cial responsibilities and obligations they should be entitled to
share the same rights equally. The basic norm of equality, as
Professor Ginsberg suggests, 102 would be clearly articulated
within the test, a feature which the middle tier equal protec-
tion analysis has always lacked.
For example, in Michael M.103 the underaged female bore
equal responsibility for consensual intercourse as did the un-
deraged male. The two individuals should have been treated
equally. The articulated state interest of discouraging teenage
pregnancy was relevant only to the issue of whether the state
should punish such activity. Assuming no other important
state interest, the statute would have failed under the new
test.
In Rostker v. Goldberg,10 4 a challenge to the male-only
draft registration system, the Court should have focused on
102. See Ginsberg, supra note 3.
103. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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the general obligation to contribute to the national defense as
a responsibility of all citizens. It can be argued that if all citi-
zens have the right to national defense, then women should be
subject to the draft to the same extent as men in order to
serve the national interest.
The test could also help to eliminate the problem of
recharacterizing the classes by refocusing the Court's notion
of equality. If the Court were satisfied that men and women
should be treated equally in a particular instance, the Court
might not be tempted to stretch the logic in search of ways to
recharacterize the classification.
In Parham v. Hughes05 the Court upheld a statute which
denied illegitimate fathers a right to sue for the wrongful
death of their illegitimate offspring by recharacterizing the
discrimination as between fathers who legitimate and fathers
who do not. Under this new test the case might be resolved
the same way, because the Court should continue to find a
non-gender basis for the distinction. The focus on the new
test, however, would shift the inquiry from asking whether the
claimant had complied with a procedural requirement toward
a more relevant inquiry concerning the extent of the unwed
father's participation in parenting. Because there are many
situations where an unwed father will assume responsibilities
toward his child, his rights should be evaluated under a stat-
ute which does not discriminate between genders on the basis
of archaic prejudice about the roles unmarried parents play.
The Court has encountered other problems in which the
classification has been defended as compensatory, such as
Kahn v. Shevin.106 A truly compensatory scheme would redis-
tribute legal rights and responsibilities in an equal fashion.
Sometimes, it would be necessary to redress an earlier imbal-
ance in legal rights and responsibilities by invoking an imbal-
ance in the opposite direction. Such a compensatory scheme
would be subjected to strong scrutiny before it could be said
to comply with the equal protection clause. As under Craig, a
mere recitation of a benign purpose would obviously fail as an
important state interest.
Moreover, a judicially approved compensatory scheme
would be conceptually tied to the goal of redistributing legal
105. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
106. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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responsibilities fairly. When the scheme failed or ceased to
produce an equitable distribution of legal rights and duties,
lower courts could consider the classification. When the com-
pensatory scheme had completed its purpose and the chain of
historic discrimination against a class had been broken, a
court would have adequate grounds for nullifying it.
The proposed test would be equally applicable in other
instances because it does not confine itself to gender. Al-
though the Craig test was developed in the context of gender
discrimination, the Court has developed a parallel middle-tier
scheme for evaluating classifications based on legitimacy.10 7
There are a number of other grounds for classification which
have never been held to the strict scrutiny standard: wealth,
age, mental and physical health. It seems that the test com-
paring the distribution of legal rights and responsibilities
among members of any class created on these grounds would
provide a sound reason for invoking the middle standard of
scrutiny.
The Supreme Court diluted the possible effectiveness of
the Craig test when it refused to confront the issue of gender
discrimination in Geduldig,0 8 Feeney,09 Parham,110 Michael
M.,1' and Rostker."2 Those who chose to recharacterize the
discrimination probably knew that under a strict application
of the Craig test the classifications would have failed. The
Court itself failed the legal system by reaching out for illogical
and vague reasons to uphold the classifications. Not only did
the Court leave the original questions about constitutionality
unanswered, but it added a layer of confusion to the Craig
test by creating new outlandish classifications (non-pregnant
persons, for example), and by injecting elements into equal
protection analysis which have little or no foundation in case
law (e.g., discriminatory intent as required by Feeney).18 Ask-
ing if the challenged classification serves to further the equal
distribution of legal rights and responsibilities between the
classes would prevent those confusing problems. The Court
107. See supra note 22.
108. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
109. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
110. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
111. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
112. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
113. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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could have used this test as a way to simplify the case law and
make less judicial "noise."
VI. CONCLUSION
The political climate of the United States has vastly
changed since the activist era of the 1970's. Access to public
entitlements, educational opportunities, equal employment
opportunity, and reproductive control are no longer consid-
ered settled issues either by the federal or state legislatures.
In light of the existing and proposed changes by the Reagan
administration, there may well be reason to question how well
the equal protection guarantee will fare. It appears that
profound changes in our interrelated economic and political
systems could spark an equal protection crisis. Even now
there is federal legislation that creates gender-based classifica-
tions."" If the equal protection clause is to be the vanguard
against gender discrimination that the ERA was intended to
have been, it is important to develop a consistent body of case
law.
Under Craig, the Court attempted to establish a more
stringent standard of review for gender based classifications
than the rationality test. Subsequent sex discrimination cases,
however, demonstrate that the Court often circumvents the
Craig test in a way which leads to unfair and inconsistent
treatment of the genders.
Alternatively to using the Craig test, the Court should
add to its Craig analysis a concept of correlative legal rights
and responsibilities which flows directly from the gender-
based equal protection cases of the 1970's. The Court ought to
adjust its view of the legal landscape accordingly. Until it
does, we can expect the confusion caused by the uncertainities
of the Craig test to continue interfering with the fulfillment of
114. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 633 (1976). The federal work incentives and job training
program creates a priority for opportunities starting with unemployed fathers, then
mothers, pregnant women and dependents last. In another example, the Black Lung
Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902 (1976), establishes federal benefits for
miners who have become disabled as a result of working in United States coal mines.
Section 902(a)(2) defines the miner's dependent as a wife and section 902(e) defines
widow as the miner's wife at the time of his death.
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the antidiscrimination principle embodied within the equal
protection clause.
Deborah A. Vaughan

